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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyses the declining importance of political parties in the Central
African Republic (CAR). The country can be considered an extreme example of
the lack of viability of a state in general, and democracy in particular. However,
the quality of elections has exceeded the average in the sub-region over a sub-
stantial time-span. Hopes for a democratic future only faded in recent years. The
paper hypothesises that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to
adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suﬀering more
in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behav-
iour are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of represen-
tation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals
seen as the main aggravating factor.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This contribution examines the relationship between violent conﬂict and
the crisis of representation in an African country by focusing on political
parties and rebel movements. It deals with the ‘chicken or the egg’ ques-
tion of whether inadequate representation leads to violent conﬂict, or
whether violent conﬂict damages representative democracy. In the general
literature on political parties, these are assumed to represent social inter-
ests ; in the context of the plural society of the Central African Republic
(CAR) these social interests are mainly ethnoregional. As will be shown,
political parties have not performed well in their representative role, for a
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number of reasons (from obstacles such as organisational shortcomings
and lack of means of communication to rent-seeking behaviour).
Numerous rebel movements also claim to put local and national grie-
vances on the agenda; these are heard and therefore seem to address the
issues better than parties. Parties and rebel movements therefore compete
to a certain extent, but political parties lose out in the course of war and in
peace processes, not least because they are no longer regarded as the main
actors by international mediators. However, only some, and not all, party
leaders become rebel leaders and vice versa, thus blurring the distinction
to (only) a certain degree.
The relationship between political parties and violence can be complex,
particularly when violence has become an established mode of compe-
tition, as is the case in many African states. More importantly, civilian
political parties may fall prey to armed insurgencies in an indirect but
signiﬁcant way: they are simply no longer the most important actors in
the political game when peace negotiations involve the government on the
one hand and rebel movements on the other. Political parties also have to
position themselves between alignment and critique with respect to
violent actors – a potentially risky business. They may ultimately lose out
as a result of power-sharing arrangements enacted in peace agreements. In
such processes they usually receive substantially less attention from
the media and the donor community present in the country than do most
armed movements (Mehler 2009). Moreover, the diﬃculties of political
parties in representing supposedly ethnoregional interests are aggravated
by rebel movements which appeal to the same clientele. Formerly violent
actors, the warlords and rebel movements may turn their organisations
into political parties and compete in future elections, when they are
often more successful than their peaceful competitors at the polls.1
In the end, political parties become marginalised. Violence pays ; democ-
racy is harmed. By focusing diﬀerently on civilian political parties – that is,
on their role in conﬂict and their (in)capacity to represent ethnoregional
interests, contrary to general assumptions ; and on rebel movements – that
is, on their ability to sideline civilian competitors rather than attempt
the diﬃcult task of transforming themselves into political parties (‘ from
bullets to ballots ’) – this paper seeks to address questions that escape
the attention of well-intentioned policy makers and mainstream research
alike.
Methodologically, the paper addresses its hypotheses in the following
way: the main (north/south) ethnoregional cleavages, together with fur-
ther types, are described and analysed in relation to the changing election
results from 1993 to 2005. The limited responsiveness of the political
116 ANDRE A S MEHL ER
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
system to ethnoregional grievances is demonstrated through the limited
amount of public goods provided in the periphery. The supposed social
and political basis of rebel movements is contrasted with their clearly op-
portunistic rent-seeking behaviour. Behavioural patterns of opposition
parties towards the use of violence are also analysed. By analysing the
composition and dramaturgy of peace processes (international negotia-
tions including power-sharing devices plus internal dialogue processes),
the paper demonstrates the declining importance of parties in the political
game. Finally, selected biographical data shows that some of the key sta-
keholders in CAR politics are straddling roles as violent entrepreneurs
and as civilian politicians, and thereby setting problematic standards for
political careers. As a result both peace and democracy have suﬀered
enormously over the last two decades.
There is a growing body of literature on the transition from rebel
movements to political parties (e.g. De Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan et al.
2007; Dudouet 2009; So¨derberg Kovacs 2008), but relatively little about
the fate or strategies of ‘ordinary’, ‘civilian’ parties in that context. Some
works speciﬁcally focus on the challenges of post-conﬂict elections
(Lyons 2005) or of power sharing ( Jarstad 2008; Mehler 2009; Sriram
2008), but most focus on the general transition to peace. The focus of the
Jarstad & Sisk (2008) volume is fortunately about ‘war to democracy
transitions ’. Its contributions show that policy makers’ expectations that
such transitions result more or less automatically in both peace and
democracy are highly problematic and naive. Manning (2004, 2007) is
interested in the description of challenges that parties themselves face in
moving from battleﬁeld to political arena. She ﬁnds (2007: 268) that in-
tense competition forces parties to adapt but does not necessarily make
them more moderate, more institutionalised internally, or more commit-
ted to democratic competition. The following pages are concerned not so
much with the organisational problems of parties – particularly violent
ones – during transition, but rather with their representational function
and their changing attitudes towards violent conﬂict.
Political parties ideally represent social interests. The latter may be in
conﬂict, and sometimes this conﬂict degenerates into violence. Sartori
(1976: 27) posits that parties are or should be ‘an instrument … for re-
presenting the people by expressing their demands’. Diﬀerent forms or
degrees of representation may be distinguished, and the symbolic/
descriptive and responsive/substantive ends of a continuum may be
juxtaposed. In the African context, mainstream authors assume that
the predominant division of social interests is frequently ethnoregional
in nature, although doubts are permitted, particularly with regard to
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the assumed link between ethnicity and party politics (Basedau &
Stroh 2009). Ethnoregional groups certainly do not exist ‘objectively ’ and
with a clear consciousness on their own. ‘Rather both groups and their
interests are to an extent constituted through the political process
itself ’ (Randall 2007: 84). Randall (2007: 101), in an initial sketch of
the representational function of political parties in Africa, comes to the
conclusion
that African political parties in general may oﬀer some degree of descriptive
representation … for ethnic groups … but that evidence of more substantive,
responsive representation of these social groups … is much harder to ﬁnd. Whilst
(some) ethnic groups may appear to enjoy a form of substantive or interest rep-
resentation, through the processes of clientelism, in reality it may be closer to
symbolic collective representation.
The question, then, is whether armed insurgencies can represent ethno-
regional interests better than political parties. One supportive argument
may be deducted from the classiﬁcation of guerilla movements by
Clapham (1998: 6) into ‘ liberation’, ‘ separatist ’, ‘ reform’, and ‘warlord’
organisations – separatist and reform movements may have the ambition
to represent ethnoregional interests.
This contribution addresses these more general points by focusing
on the case of the CAR since the mid 1990s. The country experienced a
fairly successful democratic transition in the early 1990s, but a mixture of
basic state fragility and mismanagement led to widespread violence only
a few years later (similar to Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville, where the
democratic experience was even more short-lived). The case is also an
example, as will be shown, of a ‘democracy to warlord politics transition’.
It may also be useful to point to some features of representation in the
CAR context : widespread poverty, lack of infrastructure, neopatrimonial
ethos. This mixture should inﬂuence not only popular expectations
in terms of representation, but also what role models are available
for politicians, and these politicians’ capacity to resolve problems eﬀec-
tively.
P A R T I E S A N D C L E A V A G E S , C O N F L I C T A N D V I O L E N C E I N T H E C A R
Conﬂicts are often ﬁrst and foremost non-violent. Societal cleavages are
seen as essential for the shaping of a party system, and this is generally
believed to hold true for African countries. However, the classical
European cleavages along the axes of church versus state, labour versus
capital, urban versus rural areas, centre versus periphery are only partially
relevant (Erdmann 2007).
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Ethnoregional cleavages in the CAR’s political system
For a long time, up to the end of the 1980s, themost relevant cleavage in the
CAR was more or less an ethnoregional one, with a clear north–south
divide (or savaniers versus riverains). The main political personalities of the
country – Barthe´le´my Boganda, Jean-Be´del Bokassa and David Dacko –
were south-western (from the comparatively small Ngbaka ethnic group) ;
Abel Goumba (Banziri) and Andre´ Kolingba (Yakoma) were south-central
elites. The densely populated north-west (Gbaya, Sara, and also Mandja)
felt neglected, and Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´, an ambitious up-and-coming poli-
tician and prime minister under Bokassa from 1976 to 1978, built on this
grievance, though he made his career in Bangui. The capital, with the bulk
of formal educational institutions, health centres, etc., was located in the
south.
Change did occur in the 1990s, but initially not in terms of the
general north-south divide. In fact, election results from the 1990s (1993
and 1998/9) show a remarkable similarity concerning the outcome for the
ruling party, Mouvement pour la Libe´ration du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC;
founded in 1982 and for a long time dominated by Patasse´). It received
40–50% of the votes each time, which could be explained by the existence
T A B L E 1
Legislative elections since 1993: seats per party
1993 (of 85 seats) 1998 (of 109 seats) 2005 (of 105 seats)
MLPC 34 47 11
RDC 13 20 8
FPP 7 7 2
PSD 3 6 5
ADP 6 5 2
MDD 6 8 (2)
PLD 7 2 (3)
CN 3 – –
MESAN 1 – –
MDREC 1 – –
PRC 1 – –
FC 1 1 –
PUN – 3 (3)
FODEM – 2 (1)
UPR – 1 –
KNK (platform of smaller parties) – – 42
Lo¨ndo¨ – – 1
Independent 2 7 34
Sources : African Elections Database (2009) ; other sources provide partly diﬀering information. The
results for established parties that joined the KNK platform (MDD, PLD, PUN, FODEM) are detailed
in the table (in brackets).
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of a fairly stable ethnoregional alliance (mainly Sara and Gbaya) in the
north-west and the north (Table 1). Both Patasse´ and Goumba, Patasse´’s
challenger in the second round of the 1993 presidential elections, had clear
regional strongholds, with Patasse´ winning more than 85% in three
out of seventeen prefectures (north-west : Ouham, Ouham-Pende´ and
Nana-Gribizi) and Goumba equally 85% in four, less densely populated
ones (south-east : Ouaka, Basse-Kotto, Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou).2
This ethnoregional voting pattern should not be taken as evidence of an
inability on the part of citizens to change the regime by electoral means
(and therefore a pretext for violence), as Patasse´ always needed smaller
alliance partners to get a majority. The former single party, created by
Kolingba in 1986, the Rassemblement De´mocratique Centrafricain (RDC), was
too weak to win multiparty elections, but strong enough to persist as the
major opposition party. It won its seats mostly in the southern and south-
eastern parts of the country. Kolingba’s own ethnic group, the Yakoma,
provided the party’s main support, but the Yakoma vote alone would not
have been enough to win the number of seats that the RDC actually won.
There were other notable dynamics in the political geography during the
1990s, for example, the declining popularity of the ‘ fourth’ candidate
Goumba and his Front Patriotique pour le Progre`s (FPP), a party with deep
political roots but without a continued organisational existence.3 The
RDC clearly proﬁted from the declining popularity of the Goumba camp
after the 1993 elections. Other shifting alliances in the southern block were
also observed (Mehler 2005). Thus, only the MLPC and the RDC can be
termed stable political parties.
It initially appears to have been unnecessary to compete for the votes of
ethnic parties’ ‘core’ voters. Nevertheless, at the margins of each party’s
electorate there was intense non-violent competition. The parties or their
leaders held some clientelist appeal among their followers, although
Goumba in particular never wanted to appear as the typical African ‘big
man’. In Randall’s terms (2007: 90) even the bigger parties MLPC and
RDC could be seen as representing ethnoregional interests ‘ to the extent
that parties are identiﬁed by their leaders and/or in the public mind with
one or more ethnic groups’, while it was also appropriate to ask ‘ in what
sense are they representing those groups? ’ (emphasis in the original). The
FPP and, arguably, three other parties (ADP, PSD, MDD), with their
long-lasting existence and ability to win mandates, may be seen as ad-
ditional parties of signiﬁcant importance that merit attention for the sake
of the argument of this contribution.
The ‘Northern Alliance’ was probably terminally ended by Bozize´’s
(of Gbaya origin) revolt against his former mentor Patasse´ (from the Suma
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minority, but usually identiﬁed with Sara),4 and the subsequent armed
takeover of state power in 2002/3; this split may prove important for
coalition-building in the future. Gbaya and Sara are major ethnic groups
in the north/north-west of the country, which believed that they had been
neglected since the beginning of French colonisation.5 Patasse´’s military
defeat by Bozize´ meant that the old ethnoregional cleavage (north versus
south) lost relevance, as will be demonstrated in a later section.
The relative neglect of the north was evidently not remedied when
northern politicians started to rule the country (beginning with Patasse´ in
1993). This becomes clear from the provision of public goods since the
1990s. In terms of both critical infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools) and
security, no signiﬁcant progress was recorded in the periphery.6 A certain
‘Patasse´ eﬀect ’ may be seen by comparing the net school enrolment rates
in 1988, 2000 and 2003 by region: Ouham and Ouham-Pende´, the major
Patasse´ strongholds, witnessed an increase from 29.4 and 31.5%, respect-
ively, to 37.4 and 36.0% between 1988 and 2000, with falling ﬁgures in
2003 (UNDP 2008: 146). However, Patasse´’s home prefecture of Ouham-
Pende´ still ranked sixteenth out of seventeen in 2006 with regard to re-
spondents claiming to have no education, and was only in thirteenth place
for respondents claiming to have secondary education or higher (UNFPA
& Macro International 2008: 4, 5). Vakaga prefecture, the main site of the
Union des Forces De´mocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) rebellion starting
in 2005, had the worst, and still declining, ﬁgures for school enrolment
rates (1988: 26.8%, 2000: 22.4%, 2003: 22.0%) (UNDP 2008: 146). The
record was no better with regard to security as a public good in northern
CAR. Insecurity indeed even spread under both Patasse´ and Bozize´ in
large parts of the periphery, and not only in Bangui, which had been the
main theatre of violence in 1996/7. With few exceptions, mostly in the
elite, northern populations did not proﬁt from northern government.
Growing fragmentation
The MLPC thus did not ‘deliver ’ to its main constituencies, but it was not
the only party to experience setbacks. The degree of fragmentation of the
party system has been increasing since 1993 (see Table 1). This serves as an
initial indicator of a loss of inﬂuence on the part of the main political
parties. Whereas the RDC and the MLPC together controlled forty-seven
out of eighty-ﬁve seats after the 1993 elections (55.3%), and the six most
important parties controlled ﬁfty-nine seats (69.4%), this ratio changed
with the 1998 elections : 67 out of 109 for MLPC and RDC combined
(61.4%) and eighty-eight seats for the six main parties (80.7%). Thus, the
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ﬁrst sign of the loss of importance of formal political parties appeared with
this election. Seven independent candidates were elected, compared with
two in the previous election. A big change in the legislative composition
occurred only after the successful Bozize´ rebellion in 2003. After the 2005
elections, the MLPC and the RDC together held only 19 out of 105 seats
(18.1%) and the six main parties together held twenty-nine seats (27.6%).
This result reﬂects a dramatic political change, though there was admit-
tedly no level playing ﬁeld during these elections. Can this development be
termed a crisis of ethnoregional representation? Or was it just a matter of
unfair elections? Probably not the latter : the elections were not openly
manipulated, at least not on a country-wide level. Even more signiﬁcant
than the loss of seats for major parties was the increase in the number of
candidates, thirty-four, elected as independents. These ﬁgures could be
taken as clear evidence of the declining importance of political parties in
an era of growing violence. However, political parties have themselves
been part of this evolution.7
Party-related violence
The CAR’s transitional context is obviously important for understanding
party-related violence. The CAR is an example of a transition that was
perverted by the undemocratic behaviour of democratically elected rulers
(similar to Congo-Brazzaville). President Patasse´’s governance style in-
cluded widespread mismanagement, self-enrichment, the buying of MPs
and the exclusion of formerly privileged groups. These activities formed
the background for mutinies (1996/7), coup attempts (2001/2), and the
successful rebellion (2003). Patasse´ created his own personal armed groups
(Karako militia and others), but these were not formally related to the
MLPC. This party, founded in the 1980s, was solidly anchored in society
and diﬀerent currents existed within it, some of which were critical of
Patasse´. It would be wrong to assume that the MLPC was an instrument in
the grip of its chairman Patasse´ (2009: 108). There is no doubt that at least
Patasse´ himself showed a propensity to use violence when it suited his
personal interests, while the MLPC may not have been directly associated.
Long-standing relationships between elites in the party and in the se-
curity apparatus are not simply cut oﬀ when ruling parties lose elections.8
In the CAR the former ruling party, RDC – Kolingba’s party – retained
considerable inﬂuence in the security apparatus, particularly the army,
throughout the 1990s. Nor did the RDC play in accordance with the rules
of democracy. Like other parties, it became a secondary actor in the course
of the growing militarisation of politics, which occurred from the mid
122 ANDRE A S MEHL ER
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
1990s on. The mutinies in the late 1990s and the attempted violent coup in
2001 evoked more than mere sympathy from the RDC, although – and
this is important – the party never endorsed Kolingba’s personal decision
to back the coup. Ethnic loyalty also played a role in mutinies and the
coup attempt, as former president Kolingba had predominantly recruited
troops from his Yakoma ethnic group. The resulting backlash on the RDC
was evident when the coup attempt failed.9 Electoral competition itself was
not exempt from violence in the CAR’s multiparty era, but compared with
other African cases, this violence resulted in limited damage. However,
neither of the major parties completely rejected violence as a means of
politics, at least not clearly enough.
P E A C E N E G O T I A T I O N S A N D D I A L O G U E P R O C E S S E S
The ﬁrst peace process
International actors also exerted an inﬂuence in the interplay between
civilian and armed actors in the CAR. Pushed by France, four African
presidents ﬂew in directly from the Franco-African summit in
Ouagadougou in early December 1996, and some of them again in
January 1997, to mediate between the mutineers and the government
(Ngoupande´ 1997: 78–81). The eﬀorts by Konare´, Bongo, De´by and
Compaore´ led to the signing of the Bangui Peace Accord on 25 January
1997. On 7 April, Mali’s ex-president and chief mediator Amadou
Toumani Toure´ brokered the entry of two of the mutineers into an en-
larged government. In contrast to their sidelining in peace talks from 2006
onwards, twenty-ﬁve political parties, the ﬁve main trade unions and
twelve civil society organisations signed a declaration that was then made
part of the peace accord. The ﬁrst post-agreement government installed in
February comprised approximately 50% opposition and 50% pro-presi-
dent forces. Reconciliation talks were held in Bangui in February and
March 1998 with approximately 400 participants ; the opposition alliance
G-11 took part, and although it suspended its participation for some days
for procedural reasons, a national reconciliation pact was still signed at the
end of the meeting. This was the last time that political parties played such
an important role in the peace process.
The armed conﬂicts in 1996/7 – and equally importantly, the character
of their resolution – had highly negative eﬀects on the political climate in
the country, which undermined the prospects for both democracy and the
preservation of civil peace. Furthermore, the activities of international
actors – despite good intentions – eﬀectively contributed to the poisoning
of the political environment.
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In the ﬁrst place, the character of the conﬂict-settlement process, as
promoted by international actors, ampliﬁed the tension between the
principle of accommodation and the practice of exclusionary and priva-
tised politics. International actors continuously sought broader represen-
tation of the radical and partly violent opposition, and later rebels, in
government. And something close to this objective was achieved: the
mutinies of 1996/7 led to the inclusion of some rebel leaders in roles en-
tailing governmental responsibility, as we have seen. Patasse´ also felt
compelled to include a substantial number of opposition members in
his government, but he was able to handpick which members would be
included and which portfolios they obtained. In parallel he appointed
more and more advisors, who formed a kind of a shadow cabinet where
the real decisions were taken.
Thus, this ﬁrst conﬂict-settlement episode appears to have provided a
temporary and cosmetic acceptance of inclusive politics, largely as a result
of international pressure. The practice of inclusion did not, however, lead
to any real participation in decision-making by former counter-elites.
Even less was it perceived to have led to an equal representation of
ethnoregional interests. In practice, the agreement involved an extension
of rents to those elites who had power to disrupt civil peace. That the
National Assembly later (30 October 1997) decided to attribute substantial
pensions to former presidents Dacko and Kolingba testiﬁes to this. Such
pensions were clearly a bonus for the renunciation of violence.
A dangerous precedent was established in the resolution of these con-
ﬂicts. A lesson apparently learnt by local actors was that the threat of
violence could be instrumentalised to receive material rewards. For in-
stance, the mutineers were immediately accepted as negotiating partners
and concessions were made quickly – much more quickly than to the
civilian opposition. Exerting violence proved the means to garner inter-
national attention, which, at least at ﬁrst glance, proved rewarding. One
message emanating from this situation was that those losing out in the
redistribution of sinecures should retain their capacity to sustain conﬂict
(and thus their arms). This would preserve their capacity to return to the
‘dining room’.10 One excuse for the international actors’ behaviour was
that government and rebel forces rarely fought each other and instead
targeted the civilian population, sometimes with serious humanitarian
consequences – a reason why a quick peace was sought by the inter-
national community.
Additionally, electoral violence in the CAR was constantly compara-
tively low. Campaigns resulted only in a very limited number of casualties
in 1993, 1998/9 and 2005. When the situation in the CAR is compared to,
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for instance, Kenya or Coˆte d’Ivoire, it becomes obvious that the CAR’s
political parties were not deeply involved in acts of violence. A qualiﬁed
exception is the avowed involvement of former president Kolingba in the
bloody coup attempt inMay 2001, but again it is doubtful whether his RDC
was involved: the party never formally endorsed its leader’s decision.
From Patasse´ to Bozize´
In the aftermath of the May 2001 uprising, parallel investigations created
an atmosphere of general suspicion. The dismissal and later accusation of
the chief of staﬀ, General Franc¸ois Bozize´, of being implicated in a new
coup plan was a surprising turn of events. Bozize´ refused to accept an
arrest warrant. On 3 November 2001, the UN Secretary General’s special
representative in the CAR, General Lamine Cisse´, undertook a good of-
ﬁces mission to bring the two parties together. On the basis of unwritten
concessions by both parties, President Patasse´ promised to appoint Bozize´
to another post and to consider granting a pardon once the judicial pro-
cedure was completed. For his part, Bozize´ seemed to be willing to be
questioned by the Commission of Inquiry. However, four days later
government troops attacked Bozize´’s positions.11 Bozize´ then defected
with about a hundred troops and moved to the north of the country ; after
taking weapons from several gendarmerie barracks and following a num-
ber of skirmishes, he went into exile in Chad. His troops returned to
Bangui in a surprise attack on 25 October 2002, and were repulsed after
heavy ﬁghting with Patasse´’s forces, which included Libyan troops and up
to 1,000 ﬁghters from the Congolese rebel organisation Mouvement de
Libe´ration du Congo (MLC) (Marchal 2009).
In this context, Patasse´ oﬀered a ‘national dialogue without exclusion’
on New Year’s Eve, but only gradually received support for the idea.
Political parties had a diﬃcult choice to make: siding with the republic
and accepting dialogue meant siding with a president who showed no
respect for democracy (or the constitution) ; siding with Bozize´ – which
many parties ultimately did – meant siding with a violent actor of doubtful
democratic credentials. Getting rid of Patasse´ at any price was apparently
the order of the day.
Patasse´ seemed completely isolated, the country devastated, and
democracy in shambles when another surprise attack by Bozize´’s troops
(helped by Chad) led to the conquest of Bangui on 15 March 2003. Patasse´
was at a regional summit in Niger. Upon his return he could not land,
was forced to ﬂy to Cameroon, and ﬁnally took exile in Togo. Bozize´
suspended the constitution and named a new cabinet including most
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opposition parties and with Goumba as vice-president. A National
Transitional Council (CNT) was introduced as an all-party body to serve
as the interim legislative organisation. The postponed ‘national dialogue’,
originally planned by Patasse´ for December 2002, was held from 15
September to 27 October 2003 and resulted in a sober assessment of the
country’s situation. Despite numerous statements of forgiveness and rec-
onciliation, the climate of distrust remained.
The ‘national dialogue’ in September/October 2003 – which included
many of the major civilian protagonists but not Patasse´ or his former
defence minister Jean-Jacques De´mafouth – can still be termed fairly
successful, as it led to a set of consensus decisions regarding major ﬁelds of
public life (particularly on the electoral process).12 At the beginning of
the proceedings a resolution had been tabled to bar all members of the
transitional government, including the head of state, from standing for
election. This was quickly foiled by the president’s camp, showing that
Bozize´ had long-term ambitions. Bozize´ was eventually elected president
in 2005. He included some heavyweights of the political class in his sub-
sequent government, including one of Kolingba’s sons, but excluded the
Patasse´ camp. Patasse´ himself had been excluded from standing in the
presidential elections.
The accession to power of yet another military leader exposed a major
pattern in the CAR’s political life, with the political careers of some main
ﬁgures demonstrating the straddling of two spheres of power, one civilian,
one military :
$ Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´ (MLPC): putschist, 1982; president, 1993–2003;
afterwards at least vaguely associated with some northern rebel move-
ments (Arme´e Populaire pour la Restauration de la De´mocratie (APRD),13 Front
De´mocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)).
$ Franc¸ois Bozize´ (KNK): putschist, 1982 and 2003; very disappointing
election results in 1993 (1.5%); chief of staﬀ, 2001 ; president of the
republic, 2003.
$ Andre´ Kolingba (RDC): chief of staﬀ, 1979; putschist, 1981; president of
the republic, 1981–93; at least indirectly involved in mutinies, 1996/7;
claimed to be the mastermind of the coup attempt in 2001 ; died on
7 February 2010 in a Paris hospital.
$ Charles Massi (FODEM): retired army colonel ; former mines minister
under Patasse´ ; minister of rural development under Bozize´ ; political
coordinator of the UFDC rebel movement in 2008 (later expelled) ;
founder of the armed Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix
(CPJP) ; allegedly killed in army custody in January 2010.
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$ Jean-Jacques De´mafouth (NAP): defence minister under Patasse´ ; in-
terrogated for involvement in a coup attempt, 2001; political brain
behind the APRD rebellion; in 2009 vice-president of a UNDP-
sponsored demobilisation programme.
Rebellion and a new peace process
The exclusion of Patasse´ from the elections in 2005 triggered a rebellion in
his home region. Additionally, so-called ‘ liberators ’, partly Chadian
mercenaries and partly CAR nationals who had helped Bozize´ take power
(Debos 2008), increasingly posed a security threat in the capital Bangui
and extorted money from inhabitants. They were later transported to the
border with the help of the Chadian government, and a good number of
them became rebel ﬁghters. This variation in the origin of the diﬀerent
new rebel groups may already indicate whether they could be expected to
represent larger group interests.
The various rebel movements in the northern part of the country14 from
2005 onwards were also dealt with diplomatically when they could not be
defeated by the regime. While the UFDR rebels asked for negotiations
under international mediation, Bozize´ was more than reluctant. The only
noteworthy signal was when the head of state held a one-day forum in the
National Assembly as a limited form of dialogue with all ‘vibrant parts of
the society ’, during which he at least did not rule out direct talks with
rebels. Several opposition leaders snubbed the meeting. While France in-
tervened with massive military support for the Bozize´ government, most
international donors continued to exert pressure on Bozize´ to start nego-
tiations with the rebels. Bozize´ gave in by announcing a direct dialogue in
his New Year’s speech in 2006, and thereafter started talks under the aegis
of Libya and Gabon, leading to agreements with FDPC and UFDR.
The APRD and the government ﬁnally signed a ceaseﬁre agreement on
9 May 2008, thus preparing the ground for a more inclusive peace settle-
ment. Some well-known politicians jumped on the bandwagon rather late
in the process, or revealed their intimate connection with various rebel
movements. On 29 March 2008, former defence minister De´mafouth,
who had for a long time been believed to have close links with ‘ the’
rebellion, was declared coordinator of the APRD. He had once been one
of ex-president Patasse´’s closest conﬁdants, but had then been dismissed
and arrested in 2001 in the context of the failed coup. The move to make
Charles Massi political coordinator of the UFDR came as a surprise.
Massi, a retired army colonel, had been among the most active political
entrepreneurs during the previous decade,15 and headed a small political
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party (Forum De´mocratique pour la Modernite´, FODEM). He had supported,
then opposed, both the Patasse´ and Bozize´ regimes and had held several
ministerial positions, most recently as minister of rural development until
mid January 2008. Both Massi and De´mafouth had stood for president in
the past and received only 3.2 and 1.3% of the votes respectively in the
2005 presidential election. The conclusion they seemed to draw from this
experience was that they could never win elections without taking up arms
ﬁrst. This was exactly the lesson demonstrated by Bozize´, who had re-
ceived a meagre result in the 1993 election.16
After many steps back and forth, a so-called ‘global ’ peace agreement
was signed in Libreville on 21 June by the government, the APRD
(De´mafouth), and the UFDR (local military commander Damane). It was
rejected by parts of the exiled UFDR leadership, however, and was not
signed by the third most important group, the FDPC, even though it had
attended the meeting. Fighting erupted anew in August after all three
groups withdrew from the peace process over the thorny issue of an am-
nesty law.17 With every major episode of violence, political parties gradu-
ally lost their signiﬁcance in the peace process (see Table 2).
Dialogue again, but diﬀerently
One of the original UFDR factions, Abakar Sabone’s Mouvement des
Libe´rateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ), which had left the UFDR,
joined the Libreville peace agreement only on 7 December 2008. This was
certainly not the most important rebel movement militarily, but was
probably the most outspoken one programmatically. The beginning of the
so-called ‘ inclusive political dialogue’ followed this signature. The pre-
paratory committee had presented its ﬁnal report to Bozize´ in April after
two months of negotiations between government representatives and the
three main rebel movements. The recommendations had detailed the
composition of delegates and the venue, but it took several more months
for concrete preparations to begin. In late October 2008 the APRD, the
UFDR and the government had held talks in Libreville which resulted in a
new composition of the preparatory committee, with the opposition co-
alition Union des Forces Vives de la Nation (UFVN),18 civil society organisations
and the rebel groups receiving more seats. This at last paved the way for
the holding of this important gathering of approximately 200 participants
from 8 to 20 December in Bangui.
The meeting was chaired by former Burundian president (and coup
leader) Pierre Buyoya. Patasse´ ﬂew in from his exile in Togo. His rival
inside the MLPC, Martin Zigue´le´, attended as well, as did De´mafouth,
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who had formed a political party in the meantime (Nouvelle Alliance pour le
Progre`s (NAP)). During the opening ceremony, the civilian opposition were
not allowed to take the ﬂoor. On 10 December, UFVN coordinator Henri
Pouze`re asked Bozize´ to step down for multiple violations of the consti-
tution,19 but the tide turned when Zigue´le´, whose MLPC was part of the
UFVN, explicitly recognised Bozize´ as president four days later. Towards
the end of the gathering Patasse´ joined this position. Warlord Miskine,
absent at the beginning, participated at least for the last day. In the end,
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the participants and most importantly Bozize´ agreed to form an inclusive
consensus government, hold free and transparent elections, install a
follow-up committee, and create a truth and reconciliation commission.
The follow-up committee was composed of former presidents Patasse´ and
Kolingba, plus Bozize´. There were no seats for the civilian or the armed
opposition.20 Not only in formal peace agreements but also in dialogue
processes, the civilian opposition had lost out (Table 3).
The consensus government was eventually formed on 19 January 2009,
but oﬀered only limited opportunities for participation to civilian opposi-
tion and rebel movements. Three opposition members, Moı¨se Kotaye,
Andre´ Nalke Dorogo (MLPC) and Raymond Adouma, were appointed to
the junior ministries of small and medium-sized enterprises, public health
and international cooperation, respectively. Franc¸oise Naoyama of the
APRD became the environment minister, and Djomo Didou of the
UFDR the housing minister. New rebel alliances were subsequently
formed, and new skirmishes took place in the ﬁrst half of 2009. Still in
October 2010, it would be premature to accept the success of the peace
process.
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N O F S O C I A L I N T E R E S T S V I A R E B E L M O V E M E N T S ?
Rebel movements have far more obvious direct links to the use of violence
than their civilian opponents ; but what can be said about their re-
presentational side? All in all, there have been few clear statements of
what the various rebels stand for. The most political stated aim of rebel
representatives has been ‘to sit down and to discuss ’ national problems.
They have also accused the current government of corruption, misman-
agement and the pursuit of narrow ethnic interests (of Bozize´’s Gbaya
group). The professed readiness to join a power-sharing government
might be seen as nothing more than rent-seeking behaviour and not an
acknowledgement of the need for more consensual decision-making.21
A few NGO reports consider the UFDR rebellion to have been an ex-
pression of the grievances of the Gula (HRW 2007: 78–9). UFDR presi-
dent Djotodia repeatedly criticised the ‘exclusionist ’ policies of the regime
and was quoted as follows: ‘Many people from other ethnic groups and
diﬀerent political parties are ostracised and banned from participating in
the management of the country. ’22 The best-known UFDR commander,
Zaccharia Damane, cited additional grievances : the impassability of the
roads in the region (Vakaga), the lack of health care, the lack of education,
and insuﬃcient access to potable water. The most outstanding statements
have come, however, from Abakar Sabone, a co-founder of the UFDR
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and the head of the breakaway MLCJ. In an interview in November 2006
with the local newspaper Le Conﬁdent, he declared that one of the reasons
for starting a rebellion was Bozize´’s broken promise to appoint a Muslim
prime minister.23 He also alluded to the dominance of Christians in the
management of state aﬀairs,24 saying that the aim of his rebel movement
was to force Bozize´, through the use of arms, to accept dialogue and take
T A B L E 3
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‘ the geopolitics of our country ’ seriously. When the MLCJ decided to
break away from the UFDR in summer 2008, it claimed to be working
for an overhaul of the political class – another bold statement.25 During
the inclusive political dialogue, Sabone succeeded in inscribing a re-
commendation in the oﬃcial document that the two Muslim holidays of
Aı¨d el-Fitr and Aı¨d el-Ke´bir should become national holidays (AFP
18.11.2008).
Political claims from the APRD are much more diﬃcult to ﬁnd. The
group complained – apparently from its inception in 2005 – that Bozize´
had toppled a legitimate government in March 2003, mismanaged public
funds, and divided the nation (IRIN News 2.8.2007). Such statements un-
derscored the dominant impression that the APRD was ﬁghting for
Patasse´’s return. The exclusion of Patasse´ from running for the presidency
in 2005 was another argument advanced by APRD oﬃcials (HRW 2007:
38, 42), putting it ﬁrmly in one political camp. However, local comman-
ders of the APRD occasionally said quite the contrary, that they had no
contact at all with the former president, who they claimed was a man of
the past (IRIN News 19.12.2006).
An occasional commentator on the private internet platform Sangonet
clearly exposed the ideological and programmatic poverty of all rebel
movements and declared that their activities were nothing but criminal.26
It is diﬃcult to come to a diﬀerent conclusion. It may therefore be of
greater interest to determine what the social background of rebel move-
ments is. However, we lack clear information on recruitment practices and
the ethnoregional aﬃliation of individual ﬁghters. Findings from Debos
(2008) corroborate the impression that many formerly pro-Bozize´ ﬁghters,
some of Chadian origin, joined the anti-Bozize´ rebel movements. Their
main motivation thus appears to be material gain rather than political
conviction. Regional autonomy is not a declared political goal of CAR’s
armed movements. None could be classiﬁed as Clapham’s ‘separatist ’
type. Equally, reformist credentials are hard to attest ; the ideological and
programmatic production is far from impressive. They seem closest to the
‘warlord’ type, though ‘the creation of a personal political ﬁefdom sep-
arate from existing state structures and boundaries ’ was at best transi-
tionally achieved by APRD and UFDR.27
Armed rebellion in the CAR has, however, had an unintended political
consequence. Rebel movements, their repression, and the collateral
damage in terms of human rights violations, have attracted the attention
of the ‘ international community’ – humanitarian NGOs, the UN organ-
isations, and the European Union. The number of recent reports on the
most remote areas of the CAR – particularly in the north-east, but also in
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the north – is unprecedented. Who would have talked (or even known)
about the Gula before the UFDR conquest of Birao? And it cannot be
ignored that ‘demobilisation rents ’ served part of the local population,
thereby fulﬁlling material requests – a kind of perverse eﬀect of a neopa-
trimonial form of representation in the context of violence, and one that
included neglected segments of the population (‘youth’). But at what
price? Randall (2007: 85) speculates about the possibility that political
parties themselves create the ethnoregional groups they pretend to rep-
resent ; why should this not also be true of rebellions? Ethnic grievances
are put on the national and international agendas through rebellion, de-
spite serious doubts about the sincerity of their promoters. And it should
also be immediately added that those grievances have signiﬁcantly in-
creased in the process of rebellion and repression.
It may also be signiﬁcant that the three elected members of parliament
from Vakaga prefecture – with the provincial capital Birao, the scene of
major destruction in 2006/7 – changed 100% with each election (in 1993,
1998 and 2005) and that the weight of the major parties steadily declined
over the same period (1993: 2 RDC, 1 MLPC; 1998: 1 MLPC, 1 PSD,28 1
independent ; 2005: 2 KNK, 1 independent). This may have to do gener-
ally with the viability of democracy in a country without the most basic
roads, which makes accountability on the part of elected MPs objectively
diﬃcult, as they probably would not report back, even on a yearly basis.
This is certainly a key impediment to the functioning of representational
democracy.
It may also, however, be a sign of the failure of political parties to or-
ganise themselves eﬃciently in the periphery of such a country. Can rebel
movements do better? The tendency of the CAR’s rebel movements to
transform themselves into political parties suggests rather the contrary.
However, the negative outcomes of rebel activities for the population do
not mean that these groups have not brought about change, particularly
with regard to political space. Over decades political life was centred on
Bangui and the south, and the negative consequences of the mutinies in the
1990s were concentrated there. The traditional political parties cared little
about citizens in the remote periphery, even though the Zaraguina
phenomenon (roving highway robbers, the abduction of children for ran-
som, and assaults on buses and small villages) is an old one and had a direct
impact on the lives of northerners for a long time. As a result of rebel
activities, national and international awareness of the plight of people living
in the periphery of the CAR has grown considerably over the last decade.
: : :
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Political parties have lost out both in the CAR’s recurrent violent crisis
and in the peace process. Established parties’ loss of representational
weight in parliament and their sidelining in both peace negotiations and
dialogue processes are major indicators of this. The amount of attention
given to the main political parties, and their room to manoeuvre, has
declined rapidly since 1997. The parties themselves may bear part of the
responsibility, as their relation to violence and violent actors has not al-
ways been clear, and they have oﬀered few services to the population.
Compared with other countries where peace agreements have led to
sophisticated post-conﬂict power-sharing agreements favouring rebel
movements (for example Burundi, DR Congo), however, it may be
claimed that the comparative political loss in the CAR has been limited.
At the same time it has to be noted that rewarding the use of violence by
admitting the perpetrators to the negotiating table after a show of force is
very dangerous (Tull & Mehler 2005). This could prompt even more
peaceful political parties to change their strategy, and there are convincing
signs that this will indeed be the case in the CAR.
On closer inspection, it becomes clear that the relationship between
political parties and violent conﬂicts in the CAR is highly complex, as
some of the most active political entrepreneurs create or use political
parties and military organisations (including rebel forces and the oﬃcial
army) more or less interchangeably for their purposes. This process has
clearly accelerated since 1996. The few classical parties (and civil society)
have suﬀered a political setback; they have not been able to make their
voice heard. The donor community – interested principally in a quick,
superﬁcial peace – has largely disregarded them. Civilian political parties
were invited to the two dialogue forums organised in 2003 and 2008 and
contributed to their content ; however, they were absent from the peace
negotiations proper. Finally, there have been very few attempts by the
rebel organisations themselves to occupy political space by proposing to
represent ethnic or other collective interests. Only a few, hardly convinc-
ing, claims have been voiced in this regard. With the exception of allusions
to a Muslim agenda by Abakar Sabone and the vague sympathies of the
UFDR for the Gula, the groups oﬀer little in ideological terms. Claims
from rebel groups which are heard much more frequently are that their
organisers will block the oﬃcial security forces’ attacks on civilians. The
security grievances of the population are cited as a justiﬁcation for armed
rebellion, while rebels themselves provide the context, or at least the pre-
text, for the very same brutality by armed forces.
Political parties and rebel movements in the CAR may ‘stand for ’ the
interests or grievances of ethnoregional groups, yet it is hard to identify
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many activities undertaken by these organisations which one could easily
classify as ‘acting for ’ those same groups. This latter, more substantive,
form of representation has until now been rare – maybe because of the
speciﬁc contextual conditions of the CAR. The example of Coˆte d’Ivoire,
where rebel leaders have tried hard to create their own local legitimacy
(while not standing in national elections, at least so far), and where political
parties have remained the prime political actors, suggests that there may be
important variations at play in post-conﬂict societies. Can representatives
know what the interests of the represented are without consultation? This
is diﬃcult to believe. The low level of re-elections to parliament in the
CAR, portrayed in the case of Vakaga prefecture, suggests that voters do
not consider their deputies to be responsive to their concerns. Only at the
local level is it possible that traditional forms of consultation between the
population and the (local) elite may play a role ; the other form of con-
sultation is intra-elite dialogue of dubious value. It is doubtful whether
rebel movements do any better than parties at representing group inter-
ests. They may get more or less voluntary popular support at times, but
they cannot be held accountable by the local population they claim to
defend; elected members of parliament at least face the destiny of
not being re-elected. The CAR thus faces a continued crisis of represen-
tation, and both peace and democracy have suﬀered from the recent de-
valuation of political parties and the militarisation of politics. Security
concerns are also among the main reasons cited for a repeated delay in
organising elections due in 2009 and not ﬁxed yet by October 2010. The
CAR seems on a path towards complete informality in representing social
interests.
N O T E S
1. Election results in the CAR can be taken as an expression of voting behaviour. All elections after
1993 oﬀered a choice and results were not openly manipulated (despite some noted technical short-
comings).
2. In the legislative elections the FPP did not ﬁeld any candidates in Ouham-Pende (four electoral
districts) ; the MLPC likewise ﬁelded only a single candidate in one out of ﬁve districts in Mbomou.
The RDC and the MLPC, with eighty-three and seventy-seven candidates (out of eighty-ﬁve), were
clearly aiming high and wide, followed by the FPP (ﬁfty-eight), the ADP (ﬁfty-four) and the PSD
(thrity-nine). The distribution of PSD candidates shows no clear territorial pattern. Source: calcula-
tions based on information obtained by the author at the Mixed Independent Electoral Commission
(CEMI), Bangui 1993.
3. Research on political parties in the CAR is very limited. Useful information can be found in
Bradshaw (2009). The report by UNDP (2008: 44–51) oﬀers some very general insights into the
depressing material situation and low general esteem of political parties.
4. The Suma are a Gbaya sub-group. I would like to thank Richard Bradshaw for making me
aware of this often neglected aspect.
5. It would be hazardous to display ethnic census ﬁgures, but the following groups are usually
seen as being most important: Banda, Gbaya, Sara/Mboum, Mandja, Ngbaka, Haoussa, Ngbandi,
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Zande´-Nzakara, Mbororo. Some sub-groups, such as the Yakoma (a sub-group of the
Ngbandi), have gained extraordinary prominence. Background information on some groups in Kalck
(2005).
6. The mortality rate for children under age ﬁve in Region 3 (Ouham and Ouham-Pende´, Patasse´’s
stronghold) remained among the highest in the CAR (284/1000 against a national average of 220), see
UNDP 2008: 155. The region was however better equipped with health centres in 2003 than others
(ibid. : 156). According to oﬃcial ﬁgures, the prefecture with the poorest schoolchildren/teacher ratio is
Lobaye, where Bokassa, Boganda and Dacko come from.
7. Diﬀerences in the reported election results are mostly due to Bozize´’s nebulous support base. He
relied, on the one hand, on a handful of new political parties and independent candidates together
forming the alliance Kwa Na Kwa (KNK, literally ‘work and work’) and, on the other hand, on some
established parties which lent their support, for a short time only, to the new head of state for op-
portunistic reasons.
8. Network ties may well exceed national boundaries. The salience of close relations between
security forces/security regimes in the sub-region is stressed by Marchal 2009 (CAR, Chad, Sudan,
Libya, DR Congo and Cameroon).
9. The minister of the interior suspended inter alia the activities of the party for several months.
10. The CAR example is in line with Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997: 269) argument that a
transition from neopatrimonial rule is prone to a violent end because of the tendency of the new
democratically elected president to distribute according to a neopatrimonial logic, but this time not to
the same circle of persons.
11. See the report of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council, S/2002/12, 2 January
2002.
12. A truth and reconciliation commission was, however, never established, although one of the
ﬁnal recommendations asked for it.
13. The link between the APRD and Patasse´ at the group’s founding was not evident and only later
appeared to be solid.
14. The general situation in the north-east and the north-west diverged. The north-west was
Patasse´’s home region and had suﬀered for a long time from the incursions of Zaraguinas (highway
robbers) and diverse Chadian armed movements, including the oﬃcial army (leading to self-defence
eﬀorts), while the north-east was for a long time even more marginal and has only recently suﬀered
from an increased inﬂow of arms and armed groups from neighbouring Darfur.
15. In March 2002 he had created the exiled opposition alliance Front pour la Restauration de l’Unite´
Nationale et de la De´mocratie (FRUD) with former mutineer Isidore Dokodo. He then admitted sym-
pathising with both armed movements against Patasse´, that is, Kolingba’s failed coup and Bozize´’s
rebellion.
16. It could be speculated that the main military commanders of rebel movements were unable or
unwilling to participate in negotiations and that the movements ‘needed’ experienced politicians as
spokespersons. It could also be speculated that civilian leaders used rebel groups to beneﬁt from the
rewards associated with violence. I am indebted to one anonymous reviewer who drew my attention to
these potentially powerful arguments, which, however, could not be substantiated with the material at
my disposal.
17. The law which was ultimately adopted granted amnesty to both government and rebel forces for
crimes committed after January 1999. This was crucial for De´mafouth, who was charged with the
murder of ﬁve people close to former President Kolingba in 1999. The law speciﬁcally named Patasse´,
De´mafouth and FDPC leader Miskine. This was presented as the only realistic option for peace
but came with a number of problems. First of all, Patasse´ – in exile in Togo – had been sentenced
in absentia to twenty years of forced labour for economic crimes in 2006 and the International Criminal
Court was investigating him for crimes against humanity. The amnesty law excluded genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes as well as all acts under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Jean-Pierre
Bemba, once DR Congo’s vice-president and before that rebel leader, was arrested in May 2008 near
Brussels precisely for his role in crimes against humanity perpetrated by his troops in CAR when they
fought alongside Patasse´’s army in 2002/3; see also Glasius (2008).
18. Most of the time including the MLPC and the RDC as heavyweights and the ADP as a
secondary force. Chairmanship was given to Henri Pouze`re, leader of the Association Lo¨ndo¨ and
member of parliament, who had formerly been a very outspoken civil society representative.
According to Bradshaw (2009), the UVFN had nineteen seats in parliament.
19. Pouze`re wanted to transform the inclusive political dialogue into a sort of ‘national sovereign
conference’. He also asked Bozize´ to explain the reasons for his rebellions in 2002 and 2003. In this
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way, he questioned the existence and legitimacy of any armed pursuit of political interests. See Agence
Centrafricaine de Presse 10.12.2008. His statements were apparently shocking to most participants at the
meeting.
20. Xinhua 21.12.2008.
21. See, for example, the BBC (10.11.2006) and Reuters (14.11.2006) news reports which followed the
capture of Birao by the UFDR in November 2006.
22. See IRIN News 2.11.2006. A party communique´ from 23.5.2008 expanded the argument,
claiming that the organisation would stand for the excluded silent majority of the population
(Centrafrique-presse 24.5.2008).
23. ‘Because he did not respect the pact linking us : it was agreed that we would take
power and that he would manage the transition with a Muslim prime minister ’ (translation by the
author).
24. ‘Listen Mr Journalist, if you want to drown your dog you have to accuse him of hydrophobia.
And tell me, please, whether Central African Muslims have not the right to accede to power, because
they are Muslims, Islamists and represent a danger to the nation? The Christians have governed 46
years and where are we? In paradise? No, we have to acknowledge that the CAR, our country, is a
secular and democratic state where all confessions should live in peace (Christians, Muslims, animists
and others) ’, Le Conﬁdent 8.11.2006, available at : www.sangonet.com, accessed 30.6.2009 (translation by
the author).
25. See http://www.dabio.net/RCA-RETRAIT-DU-M-L-C-J-DE-CAPITAINE-ABAKAR-SABONE-
de-l-UFDR_a1210.html, accessed 3.8.2009 (translation by the author) : ‘The necessity of an overhaul of
the Central African political class, of ceasing to eternalise the interests of the old political class that has
suﬃciently demonstrated its limits and lack of patriotism, because we all have seen them in practice:
negative results. ’
26. ‘And none of those rebels, even those who claim to be the most eloquent, such as Sabone and
Gazambe´ti, seem to have diﬃculty explaining the reasons for their rebellions and convincing the
citizens. They have never deemed it necessary to explain to Central Africans their real political and
revolutionary ideology, which guided them really and which led to the establishment of a political
opposition by initiating youths in the bush instead of giving them a professional education with
perspectives diﬀerent from those of robbers ’, www.sangonet.com, 3.8.2007 (Jean-Didier Gaı¨na), ac-
cessed 30.6.2009 (translation by the author).
27. Clapham (2007: 229) acknowledges the need to further diﬀerentiate the warlord movement
category and proposes some variables. CAR looks like an example for the salience of incentives created
by external engagement on rebel movement creation.
28. Elected PSD candidate Dieudonne´ Koudoufara defected to the MLPC shortly after the
elections and made the formation of a majority government possible (adding to the originally
elected 47 MLPC plus 2 PLD and 5 pro-Patasse´ independents, resulting in 55 pro-Patasse´ seats out
of a total of 109). Such opportunistic behaviour certainly does not go down well with the electorate.
Koudoufara was a MLPC candidate in 2005 but was not elected.
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